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RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING AND 
HOMESCHOOLING BEFORE AND 
AFTER HOBBY LOBBY 
James G. Dwyer* 
The most serious incursions on religious liberty in America to-
day are being inflicted on children by parents and private school op-
erators through power the State has given them. This Article examines 
the potential effect of the Court’s Hobby Lobby decision on interpret-
ing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) on both feder-
al and state levels, detailing why the Court’s decision is irrelevant to 
addressing the incursions on liberty experienced by children subject to 
religious and home schooling. 
Ultimately, the Article finds that home schools and private 
schools are unfazed by the Hobby Lobby decision in their capacities 
as employers and educators because (1) unchanged free-exercise ju-
risprudence accords stronger constitutional protection to parents 
against state oversight, (2) religious schools are generally operated by 
religious entities whose RFRA standing is already well established, 
(3) Hobby Lobby interpreted a law that imposes restrictions only on 
the federal government, (4) federal laws governing employers gener-
ally exempt religious entities, (5) federal laws pertaining specifically 
to schooling do not apply to private schools, and (6) state legislatures 
already voluntarily leave religious schools entirely unregulated, ex-
cept for some standard, superficial business regulations.  
Even with RFRA’s version of strict scrutiny post-Hobby Lobby, 
states could nonetheless regulate private and home schooling. The Ar-
ticle concludes that state inaction will continue as a result of a trou-
bling pervasive indifference—stemming from societal attitudes and 
fundamental misconceptions about childrearing—toward children 
subject to these types of schooling.  
  
                                                                                                                                      
 *  Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Momentous as it is for the history of religious accommodation in the 
United States, the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby1 
is irrelevant to the experience of children in religious schools and home 
schools. As this Article will explain, some of the reasons why that is so 
are deeply troubling. 
Most people asked to think about the impact of Hobby Lobby on 
religious schools or home schools would turn their attention to the con-
cerns of religious school operators and of parents, both of whom pre-
sumably wish to be free of state regulation. Some parents might prefer 
that the schools they patronize be subject to laws regarding health, safe-
ty, and background checks,2 but probably few would want state laws and 
regulations relating to the content of curriculum or the qualifications of 
teachers to apply to those schools. 
From a child-centered perspective, however, one is likely to have, if 
one is familiar with the universe of religious and home schooling,3 the 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 2. See, e.g., U.L. v. N.Y. State Assembly, 592 F. App’x 40, 41 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal 
of complaint by parent of child attending religious school that state law requiring criminal background 
checks only for public schools violated the equal-protection rights of parents and children attending 
private schools). 
 3. For examples of religious and home schools that are, in terms of the State’s aims for chil-
dren’s education, troubling, see, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 
16–44 (1998); ROBERT KUNZMAN, WRITE THESE LAWS ON YOUR CHILDREN: INSIDE THE WORLD OF 
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opposite wish—that is, to have all schools subject to state oversight to 
guard against educational deprivation. Whereas from an adult-centered 
perspective one is likely to wonder whether Hobby Lobby improved the 
situation with respect to religious schools, from a child-centered perspec-
tive one should wonder whether Hobby Lobby has made things even 
worse. Things have in fact long been quite bad for children outside the 
public-school system, from a regulatory standpoint.4 From either per-
spective, though, one should conclude that Hobby Lobby had no signifi-
cant effect on the operations of religious or home schools. 
The decision potentially affects a school as an employer and as a 
provider of educational services. Part II considers the employment side, 
Part III the educational side. 
II. SCHOOLS AS EMPLOYERS 
The specific dispute in Hobby Lobby arose in an employment law 
context. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”)5 requires certain 
employers to provide their employees with health insurance that covers 
certain health services. Some of those services are ones that some people, 
including owners and operators of businesses, from a religious perspec-
tive might deem immoral. The case presented the Court with two basic 
questions: (1) Do the protections of the federal Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act (“RFRA”) extend at all to secular, for-profit, closely-held 
corporations; and, (2) if so, does RFRA require an exemption from the 
ACA’s mandate of coverage for contraceptives that can act as abortifi-
cients, if the corporation’s owners have religious beliefs that prohibit 
them from facilitating abortion. 
These questions are, on the surface, patently irrelevant to home 
schools, because they are neither corporations nor employers. Yet, how 
the Court answered the second question has implications even for indi-
viduals asserting religious liberty claims, because its answer included 
general interpretations of particular aspects of RFRA, and Part III, be-
low, discusses that. 
The first of these two questions is, on the surface, also patently ir-
relevant to religious schools. Such schools are uniformly operated by re-
                                                                                                                                      
CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN HOMESCHOOLING 43–87 (2009); MITCHELL L. STEVENS, KINGDOM OF 
CHILDREN: CULTURE AND CONTROVERSY IN THE HOMESCHOOLING MOVEMENT 104–05 (2001);  
Jessica Huseman, The Frightening Power of the Home-Schooling Lobby, SLATE (Aug. 27, 2015), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/life/education/2015/08/home_school_legal_defense_association_how_a_home_s
chooling_group_fights.html; Frances Patterson, With God on Their Side, RETHINKING SCH. (2002), 
http://www.rethinkingschools.org/special_reports/voucher_report/v_god162.shtml (describing extreme 
bias in religious schools’ social studies text books). For the view that “faith schools” are inherently 
indoctrinatory, see generally Michael Hand, A Philosophical Objection to Faith Schools, 1 THEORY & 
RES. EDUC. 89 (2003); Barbara Miner, School Vouchers: A Threat to the Rights of Women and Gays, 
Rethinking Schools, RETHINKING SCH. (Feb. 2002), http://www.rethinkingschools.org/special_reports/ 
voucher_report/v_gay.shtml. 
 4. See James G. Dwyer, No Accounting for School Vouchers, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 
363–64 (2013) [hereinafter No Accounting]. 
 5. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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ligious organizations or nonprofit corporations, and it is already well es-
tablished that the federal RFRA extends beyond individuals to protect 
the religious freedom of those entities.6 Half of religious schools are 
Catholic, operated by a local parish, a diocese, or a religious order (e.g., 
the Jesuits).7 The next largest fraction of religious schools are conserva-
tive Christian schools, typically operated by a single church, though there 
are also large conservative Christian academies operated by nonprofit 
corporations.8 Many other religious denominations claim a small per-
centage of religious schools each, and their schools are also typically op-
erated by a local worship facility or by a religious organization oversee-
ing many local, religious communities.9 There is no question that any 
religious school could invoke RFRA to challenge any federal law that 
substantially infringed its religiously driven activities. Again, though, 
what the Court said in applying RFRA, about how to interpret particular 
aspects of that Act’s test for permissibility of burdens on religious free-
dom, is pertinent for any entity invoking the Act in any context, so dis-
cussion of that in Part II is pertinent. 
With respect to the ACA, on the whole, it applies only to employers 
with fifty or more full-time employees, which the Court indicated exclud-
ed thirty-four million workers nationwide.10 A substantial portion of reli-
gious schools in the U.S. are operated by religious organizations that 
have only a small number of employees, perhaps even just one congrega-
tion pastor. Whether schools affiliated with a large denomination—in 
particular, Catholic schools, which account for roughly half of all children 
attending religious schools11—are subject to the ACA depends in part on 
whom the Department of Health and Human Services deems the “em-
ployer,” specifically, whether it is a local church community or a regional 
authority or the umbrella religious institution encompassing all local and 
regional subdivisions. Further, the ACA also exempts employers who 
had a health plan for their employees before the ACA’s enactment and 
continue to maintain essentially the same plan. The exemption encom-
passed roughly fifty million workers in 2013, and likely included many 
religious organizations.12 Moreover, the regulations implementing the 
specific ACA provision concerning coverage for contraceptives exempt 
religious employers, including “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and 
conventions or associations of churches.”13 As noted above, operators of 
religious schools are uniformly religious organizations, not secular, for-
                                                                                                                                      
 6. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69. 
 7. See Facts and Studies, CAPENET.ORG, http://www.capenet.org/facts.html (last visited Mar. 9, 
2016). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764. 
 11. See Facts and Studies, supra note 7. 
 12. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763–64. 
 13. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2015); What Churches Should Know About IRS Form 990-N, 
CHRISTIANITY TODAY (May 13, 2010), http://www.churchlawandtax.com/blog/2010/may/what-chur 
ches-should-know-about-irs-form-990-n.html. 
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profit corporations. On the whole, then, the specific issue before the 
Court—namely, must employers religiously opposed to facilitating abor-
tion nevertheless provide health insurance to employees that includes 
coverage for medicines that can act as abortificients—was a non-issue for 
religious schools. 
Other types of laws regulating employment that could conflict with 
religious beliefs include anti-discrimination laws, health and safety regu-
lations, and credentialing requirements. Some such other federal laws, 
though, likewise exempt religious entities—for example, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion.14 More gen-
erally, with respect to hiring and firing, there is a well established “minis-
terial exception” within free-exercise jurisprudence, exempting religious 
organizations from anti-discrimination laws in connection with their hir-
ing and firing of employees who serve in a “ministerial” role, a concept 
not yet well defined but likely to include any teacher in a religious 
school.15 Any remaining laws without a religious exemption could poten-
tially provoke a RFRA demand for exemption, but apart from creden-
tialing, any such laws (1) do not directly impact the experience of chil-
dren in religious schools, (2) are exceedingly unlikely to conflict with 
anyone’s religious beliefs (e.g., building safety regulations), or (3) are ex-
ceedingly unlikely to be successfully challenged under RFRA (e.g., any-
thing relating to health and safety). And importantly, as discussed further 
below, as it happens neither the federal nor state governments impose 
any teacher-credential requirement on religious schools. 
III. SCHOOLS AS EDUCATORS 
The most important question relating to religious schools or home-
schooling is whether Hobby Lobby could affect the content of instruction 
students receive or the way school administrators and teachers treat 
young people in their custody. Whether an employer will be forced to 
comply with a law that conflicts with its religious beliefs and whether an 
employee must change employers in order to have coverage for certain 
contraceptives (or pay for contraceptives out of pocket) are both im-
portant issues. Both, however, are far less important to human well-being 
than the quality of education children receive, and whether children are 
                                                                                                                                      
 14. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding the exemption in Title VII); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 
U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act does not authorize NLRB juris-
diction over lay faculty at church schools because it aims to avoid the constitutional issues such juris-
diction would raise); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 15. Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 701 
(2012) (finding a religious organization immune from an unlawful termination suit under the ADA by 
a teacher who fell within the free exercise “ministerial exception”); Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-
South Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1181–82 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (finding a Roman Catholic diocese can 
lawfully decline to renew the contract of a pregnant teacher in a religious school if it relied on a sin-
cere belief regarding the morality of in vitro fertilization). 
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protected from abusive treatment. The amount of attention paid to the 
former two issues is perverse in light of the widespread public indiffer-
ence to the damage done to many children as a result of attending reli-
gious schools or home schools, an indifference I attempt to explain in the 
final part of this Article. 
One part of the explanation merits acknowledgement up front. The 
image people generally have of religious schools is positive, because the 
only awareness of religious schools people typically have is of schools 
that either are operated by their own ideological community or are suffi-
ciently unconcerned about incurring criticism that they are highly visible 
in the community. Similarly, the home schoolers that one is likely to be 
aware of are either within one’s circle of friends and family or actively 
involved in community activities. But there is a less visible world of reli-
gious and homeschooling that the vast majority of Americans would, I 
have no doubt, find quite disturbing if they knew about it. It has become 
increasingly difficult to know about it because the religious schools and 
home schoolers whose practices are most divergent from the norm have 
been quite reclusive for the past few decades, in part because ethno-
graphic work done on them in the 1970s and ‘80s painted a quite negative 
picture.16 In addition, there have been almost no court battles over regu-
lation of such schools in recent decades because, as discussed further be-
low,17 states gave up on trying to regulate them. 
There are three basic types of regulations that one might think 
ought to exist for all schools: (1) regulation of content, such as a manda-
tory curriculum or requirement of special services for disabled students; 
(2) performance assessment requirements, such as standardized testing, 
review of student portfolios, or observation of instruction; and (3) norms 
for treatment of students, such as gender equality and freedom of expres-
sion. U.S. public schools are subject to all three types of regulations.18 
There is plenty of criticism of the particular form regulations of the 
second sort take, but no reasonable person maintains that public schools 
should be freed from all regulations of any of the three types. Even a 
strong defender of public schools in general, or of the local public 
schools, would balk at the notion of leaving each school’s administration 
or individual teachers entirely free to choose the content of the curricu-
lum they provide; this would inject a high degree of arbitrariness into the 
nature of each child’s schooling, would make comparative assessment ex-
tremely difficult, and would contradict the aim of ensuring shared 
knowledge among citizens. Likewise, the idea of leaving public school 
                                                                                                                                      
 16. I summarized the ethnographic work on religious schools in DWYER, supra note 3, at 7–44. 
For observations of home schools, see KUNZMAN, supra note 3. 
 17. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 18. See Know Your Rights: A Guide for Public School Students in Washington, ACLU (2007), 
https://aclu-wa.org/library_files/Guide%20for%20Public%20School%20Students.pdf; State Regulation 
of Private Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July 2009), http://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/regpr 
ivschl/index.html?exp=5; What is Performance-Based Assessment, STANFORD SRN (2008), https://ed 
policy.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/events/materials/2011-06-linked-learning-performance-based-
assessment.pdf. 
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teachers entirely unaccountable for their performance, by eliminating 
comparative assessments of student progress, would receive little or no 
public support. Many Americans, including Supreme Court Justice Clar-
ence Thomas,19 might be more comfortable with the idea that restrictions 
on how school employees treat children are unnecessary, given the pre-
sumed ability of parents to object and exit a school.20 That presumption is 
inaccurate, however, as to a large percentage of children.21 And even 
when it is accurate, it is inadequate to protect another large percentage 
of children—namely, those who might share a particular school admin-
istration’s illiberal values, such as gender subordination, or hold no re-
spect for the physical integrity of children or of children’s interest in be-
coming autonomous. There is certainly room for improvement in states’ 
regulatory schemes for public schools, but no reasonable person would 
endorse complete deregulation of them. 
The pertinent question here, then, is whether the Hobby Lobby de-
cision has any implications for any of these types of regulation for reli-
gious schools or home schools. In answering that question, it is important 
first to clarify who would likely be the plaintiffs in any RFRA or consti-
tutional challenge to regulation of religious schools or home schools as 
educators (rather than as employers). Although religious organizations 
operating schools could themselves assert a religious-freedom claim 
against such regulation, in this context (as opposed to employment is-
sues) the legal system also accords rights to parents of students, the nom-
inal “customers” of the businesses.22 In fact, parents have more often 
been the plaintiffs in litigation challenging state regulation of private 
schools because their rights regarding children’s education are generally 
regarded as stronger than, or at least as strong as, the rights of religious 
school operators.23 The commercial substantive due-process rights at the 
heart of the Supreme Court’s Lochner-era decisions relating to school-
ing, Pierce24 and Meyer,25 died with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,26 but 
the parents’ rights doctrine that the Court gratuitously initiated in those 
                                                                                                                                      
 19. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 400 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“If parents do not like the rules imposed by those schools, they can seek redress in school boards or 
legislatures; they can send their children to private schools or home school them; or they can simply 
move.”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Transfer Policies, NYC DEP’T. OF EDUC., http://schools.nyc.gov/Academics/Special 
Education/enrolling/transfer/default.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2016) (noting children may only be re-
moved from school for certain hardships). 
 22. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (“Thus, a State's interest in universal educa-
tion, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fun-
damental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of 
their children . . . .”). 
 23. See Joy Pullmann, School Choice Fights Will Shift to Regulation, FEDERALIST (June 17, 
2014), http://thefederalist.com/2014/06/17/school-choice-fights-will-shift-to-regulation/. 
 24. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Name of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 25. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 26. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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cases survived the demise of Lochner.27 In fact, in two post-Lochner-era 
cases, Prince28 and Yoder,29 the Court established that when parents as-
sert both a parental right under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee 
of substantive due process and a religious-freedom right under the First 
Amendment, to challenge a law that thwarts their child-rearing prefer-
ences, courts should subject the law to strict scrutiny.30 The analysis here 
will therefore focus on what effect, if any, Hobby Lobby had on parental 
rights over children’s schooling. 
A. Do Parents Need a RFRA? 
Hobby Lobby interprets a law adopted to, in effect, restore to free-
exercise law what Employment Division v. Smith31 had taken away—
namely, strict scrutiny of laws that, although on their face religiously neu-
tral and of general applicability, conflicted with some persons’ religious 
beliefs.32 Yet, some lower courts have concluded that Smith did not take 
anything away from parental, free exercise constitutional rights. They in-
fer from Justice Scalia’s Smith dictum about hybrid rights that Yoder sur-
vived Smith—that is, that strict scrutiny would still apply to cases in 
which parents assert both a free-exercise claim and a substantive due 
process, parental-rights claim.33 If that view is correct, then both federal 
and state RFRAs are superfluous for parents seeking to resist legal re-
strictions on their child-rearing decisions and actions. 
It would be ironic and troubling if Smith did in fact leave Yoder in-
tact. It would mean that the Supreme Court has effectively accorded 
stronger constitutional protection against state oversight to adults exer-
cising power over the lives of other, dependent beings than to adults en-
gaged in self-determination. Constitutional protection of one’s control 
over one’s own life ought to be far stronger than protection of one’s de-
sire to control someone else’s life. And in fact, outside the parenting con-
text, that is uniformly true. For example, pro-lifers have no constitutional 
right to control the choices of pregnant women, and offspring in a guard-
ianship position with respect to their elderly parents have no constitu-
tional right in relation to their surrogate decisionmaking for the parents.34 
                                                                                                                                      
 27. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390. 
 28. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 29. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). 
 30. See id. at 215; see generally Prince, 321 U.S. at 168–69. 
 31. Emp’t Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). 
 32. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014). 
 33. See, e.g., Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 701 F. Supp. 2d 863, 881 (S.D. Tex. 2009) 
(finding hair style regulations at an elementary school unnecessary to meet the school’s stated goals of 
maintaining order, discipline, and hygiene); Hicks v. Halifax Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 
653–54, 663 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (involving challenge to mandatory uniform policy at an elementary 
school that was not a response to any particular problem with student dress). 
 34. See James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of 
Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1405–23 (1994) (documenting pervasive rejection in the law of 
the notion of rights to control the life of another person) [hereinafter Parents’ Religion]. 
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Smith had the potential to give states greater freedom and confi-
dence in acting to protect the developmental interests of children whose 
parents, for religious reasons, reject for their children basic liberal values 
such as autonomy, gender equality, and preparation for a broad range of 
careers in mainstream society.35 Legislation like RFRA can itself con-
strain states in this regard, taking back from legislators and local gov-
ernments freedom that Smith gave them. But such legislation expanding 
individual rights against government is susceptible to legislative revision 
at any time, whereas getting the Supreme Court to reverse itself is in 
most contexts a quite long and difficult process. In addition, whereas the 
Court had unthinkingly treated legal restrictions on parenting as a sub-
stantial burden on adults’ exercise of religion (more on this below), 
courts interpreting a religious-freedom statute could in theory conclude 
that having one’s power over other persons’ lives limited is never a sub-
stantial burden on one’s own religious freedom. 
Other lower courts, however, have held that the Smith dictum is to 
be ignored, some echoing the near consensus among academic commen-
tators that the hybrid-rights notion is incoherent and illogical.36 On the 
assumption, then, that Smith might have done away with strict scrutiny 
for parenting cases, as well as other types of cases, assessing the potential 
effects of Hobby Lobby for private-sector schooling requires delving fur-
ther into its specific holdings. 
 
B. Does the Federal Government Play Any Role in Religious or  
Homeschooling? 
An additional reason why Hobby Lobby is irrelevant to religious 
and home schooling of children is that it interprets the federal RFRA, 
which is applicable only to the federal government following City of 
Boerne v. Flores.37 Apart from employment discrimination laws and the 
ACA, the federal government simply does not attempt to regulate pri-
vate schooling; it leaves this to state government.38 Certainly, there are no 
federal laws constraining in any way the curriculum that religious schools 
provide. The federal laws that most greatly impact public schooling—the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the No Child Left Be-
hind Act (“NCLBA”)—apply only to public schools.39 
                                                                                                                                      
 35. Id. at 1447. 
 36. See Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 246–47 (3d Cir. 2008); Leebaert v. Har-
rington, 332 F.3d 134, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2003); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Stratton, 
240 F.3d 553, 561 (6th Cir. 2001); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 
1993). 
 37. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
 38. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., State Regulation of Private Schools, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/ 
admins/comm/choice/regprivschl/index.html?exp=5 (last updated Oct. 10, 2012). 
 39. See 20 U.S.C. § 7886(b) (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect a home 
school, whether or not a home school is treated as a home school or a private school under State law, 
nor shall any student schooled at home be required to participate in any assessment referenced in this 
chapter.”).  
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Indeed, there does not seem to be much of a constitutional basis for 
Congress to assert itself into the content of private schooling. If the fed-
eral government provided financial assistance to private schools, it might 
be able to condition that assistance on recipients’ compliance with re-
quirements for curriculum, assessment, and treatment of students, but 
currently there are no federal spending programs that extend to private 
schools.40 A federal voucher program could create a hook for Congress to 
influence the content of education in religious schools, but proposals for 
federal vouchers have yet to succeed and would be extremely unlikely to 
include any meaningful regulatory strings.41 
Arguably, it is also troubling that the federal government leaves the 
private sector of schooling untouched. To the extent that federal laws 
applicable to public schools, such as the NCLBA, have benefited any 
children, pupils in private schools might be missing out as a result of their 
parents’ enrolling them in a non-public school. The assessment and ac-
countability aspects of NCLBA,42 in particular, could be effective in ex-
posing some of the worst religious and home schools. If the federal gov-
ernment went further in the future in trying to promote more rigorous 
education for children—for example, with a national testing regime—it 
would almost certainly again limit itself to public schools. It has estab-
lished a pattern of doing so, and whereas public schools have become a 
favorite whipping post for some conservatives,43 no political faction mani-
fests any interest in the fate of children whose parents make them attend 
a religious school. Yet, if any government could overcome resistance 
from illiberal religious communities in order to exert oversight over reli-
gious and home schools, it might be that the federal government is more 
likely to be able to do so than many state governments, simply because it 
is a far larger fish for any religious group to capture. 
Although Hobby Lobby is not directly relevant to regulation of re-
ligious and home schools, because it affects only federal government ac-
tion, it could nevertheless have an indirect effect in some states on state 
law governing religious schools, because (1) nearly half of the states have 
                                                                                                                                      
 40. The IDEA authorizes funding for provision of special education services to children in pri-
vate schools, but it directs money to local public school districts, which themselves provide the ser-
vices, and federal regulations stipulate that federal funds given to local public school districts for this 
purpose may not benefit the private school or help special needs pupils beyond providing the special 
education services. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.141 (2016); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): PROVISIONS RELATED TO CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 
ENROLLED BY THEIR PARENTS IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS 3 (2008), available at http://www2.ed.gov/ 
admins/lead/speced/privateschools/idea.pdf. Federal law does exempt religious organizations from 
income tax and makes donations to such organizations deductible for donors, so those benefits might 
provide a route to regulation. 
 41. See Valerie Strauss, The New Push for School Vouchers at State, Federal Levels, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/02/12/the-new-push-for-
school-vouchers-at-state-federal-levels. Cf. Dwyer, No Accounting, supra note 4, at 383–94 (describing 
the lack of regulatory strings in state voucher programs). 
 42. See 20 U.S.C. § 7885 (2012). 
 43. Strauss, supra note 41. 
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adopted their own religious-freedom act since the Smith decision;44 and 
(2) some state courts have followed federal-court interpretation of the 
federal RFRA in interpreting their state’s RFRA.45 We should therefore 
consider whether the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal 
RFRA in Hobby Lobby could indirectly and incidentally alter the pos-
ture of religious schools relative to state regulation. 
C. Religious Schools Have Nothing to Seek Exemption From 
Yet, another, and perhaps the most troubling, reason why Hobby 
Lobby is irrelevant to religious schooling and home schooling is that 
states, too, leave these schools unregulated.46 This is an important reality 
about which, my experience suggests, the vast majority of Americans are 
unaware. All U.S. states leave private schools alone to do pretty much 
whatever they want with the children who attend them rather than a pub-
lic school. For the most part, this is not accomplished by explicit exemp-
tions to otherwise universally applicable school regulations, but rather by 
enacting education laws—and, in particular, anything having to do with 
curriculum, assessment, and teacher qualifications—that apply in the first 
instance only to public schools.47 These laws simply do not contemplate 
applying restrictions to any private schools, religious or secular. Many 
states also offer some sort of state accreditation to private schools, condi-
tional upon accepting certain requirements and oversight, but that is vol-
untary on the part of the schools.48 Some seek state accreditation, or ac-
creditation by a private school organization approved by the state, 
because it enhances their reputation in the market they serve.49 But, of 
course, the schools the state should most worry about are the ones who 
categorically reject state authority over their child-rearing, who might ac-
tually suffer in reputation among the parent population they aim to serve 
if they acquiesce to state-education officials. 
The only types of regulations that states do apply universally to pri-
vate (including religious) schools, whether they want them or not, are 
those that apply also to secular and non-educational businesses, such as 
                                                                                                                                      
 44. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, State Religious Freedom Restoration 
Acts, NCSL.ORG (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-stat 
utes.aspx (identifying twenty-one states). 
 45. See Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions 
from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 72 n.68 (2015) (citing lower court deci-
sions in three states); see also id. at 72 & n.69 (citing state supreme court decisions treating their inter-
pretation of a state RFRA as independent of federal court interpretation of the federal RFRA and 
stating that “states are not required to follow federal case law in interpreting state statutes; state courts 
are free to construe their own statutes independently.”). 
 46. See James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and 
Educational Law as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 
1321, 1338 (1996) [hereinafter Children We Abandon]. 
 47. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 16-23-1, 16-23-8 (2016); N.Y. EDUC. L. § 3001 (McKinney 2016); see 
also Dwyer, supra note 46, at 1338 n.60. 
 48. See Dwyer, Children We Abandon, supra note 46, 1338–39. 
 49. See generally id. at 1339. 
  
1404 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
building-safety codes.50 This is typically true even when states offer 
vouchers or other schemes of overt financial state support for religious 
schooling; the financial support is typically offered with no meaningful 
regulatory strings, even though these funding schemes could constitute 
an excellent mechanism for attempting to eliminate bad private schools.51 
At most, voucher laws have imposed as a condition for participation a 
requirement that schools receiving state money not discriminate on the 
basis of race in admissions, a rather meaningless provision that neverthe-
less made the Supreme Court think the state actually demands something 
in return for subsidizing private schools.52 Some states make modest ef-
forts to check the educational progress of home-schooled students, but 
most leave home schools likewise unsupervised—at least those claimed 
to be religious home schools.53 
Thus, the most important features of a school from a child-centered 
perspective—that is, what qualifications teachers have, the content of the 
curriculum, whether a school has incentives to provide a good education, 
and how teachers and administrators treat students—are already entirely 
unregulated in the private-school sector. Why? Because legislators tend 
to harbor a mistaken and grossly exaggerated understanding of parents’ 
constitutional rights, and because state officials have nothing to lose by 
exempting private schools and only headaches to gain by trying to im-
pose regulations on belligerent, fundamentalist religious groups prepared 
to take up arms to defend their view of parental sovereignty over chil-
dren’s upbringing.54 
In sum, Hobby Lobby is irrelevant to the experience of children in 
religious schools, because (1) Smith might not have overturned Yoder, 
(2) religious schools are generally operated by religious entities whose 
RFRA standing was already well-established, (3) Hobby Lobby inter-
preted a law that imposes restrictions only on the federal government, 
(4) federal laws governing employers generally exempt religious entities, 
(5) federal laws pertaining specifically to schooling do not apply to pri-
vate schools, and (6) state legislatures already voluntarily leave religious 
schools entirely unregulated, except for some standard, superficial busi-
ness regulations. For someone who worries about religious schools that 
                                                                                                                                      
 50. See Dwyer, No Accounting, supra note 4, at 383. 
 51. Id. at 383–94. 
 52. See James G. Dwyer, Funding Religion in a Post-Zelman World, 5 GOV’T L. & POL’Y J. 11, 13 
(2003) [hereinafter Funding Religion]. 
 53. See Huseman, supra note 3; Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional 
Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 130 (2008). In Virginia, state law establishes as a 
general rule for home schooling: a parent must get approval from the local public-school officials 
based on demonstration of an adequate curriculum and capacity to teach, and must show adequate 
academic progress after each year of home schooling. But then the rule pronounces that any children 
whose parents are “by reason of bona fide religious training or belief is conscientiously opposed to 
attendance at school” are entirely exempted from any educational requirements whatsoever. VA. 
STAT. ANN. § 22.1-254(B)(1) (2016). 
 54. See DWYER, supra note 3, at 8–13, 45–61; Huseman, supra note 3; Motoko Rich, Home 
Schooling: More Pupils, Less Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/ 
05/education/home-schooling-more-pupils-less-regulation.html?_r=0. 
  
No. 4] RELIGIOUS AND HOMESCHOOLING AFTER HOBBY LOBBY 1405 
fail to provide an adequate secular education and/or that mistreat stu-
dents (e.g., by oppressively sexist practices), things could not be worse 
than they already were before Hobby Lobby. Some children in America 
were already being denied equal opportunity and basic liberties because 
of the religious beliefs of parents and school operators, and this is still 
so.55 
D. Things Also Cannot Get Any Better 
What Hobby Lobby might have done, though, is to make it more 
difficult for things to get any better if the federal government or any state 
government (in a jurisdiction where courts interpret their state RFRA in 
accordance with federal court interpretation of the federal RFRA) ever 
attempted to extend any substantive requirements or oversight to private 
schools.56 A government might do this in a deliberate effort to reign in 
rogue religious schools, perhaps after media disclosure of some especially 
troubling phenomenon like jihadist training in a religious academy, or 
simply because of teacher union or public complaints about the unfair-
ness of imposing burdensome regulations only on public schools. Perhaps 
one day feminists will take a serious interest in the subordinating indoc-
trination to which girls are subjected in many religious schools and home 
schools. Hobby Lobby not only decided who is a person for RFRA pur-
poses, and who therefore can legitimately invoke RFRA against such 
government action, but also applied the federal RFRA to a particular 
law and in the process signaled how stringent the federal RFRA test is, 
regardless of to whom it is applied.57 Specifically, the Court appeared to 
adopt a minimalist conception of burden on religious freedom and a 
maximalist conception of least restrictive means.58 
How could protection of a child’s education interests burden some-
one else’s religious freedom? Prior to Hobby Lobby, some lower federal 
courts had interpreted the substantial burden threshold test of RFRA to 
require showing that federal government action seriously impedes carry-
ing out a core aspect of one’s religion.59 On that understanding of sub-
stantial burden, parents should be deemed to have no standing to object 
to laws requiring that children attend either a state-provided school or a 
private school that satisfies robust requirements for curriculum, assess-
ment, and treatment of pupils. Such laws would not interfere with par-
                                                                                                                                      
 55. See Dwyer, Children We Abandon, supra note 46, at 1388–89; Michael Stone, In Memoriam: 
Leelah Alcorn, Victim of Christian Homeschooling, PATHEOS (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.patheos.com/ 
blogs/progressivesecularhumanist/2015/12/in-memoriam-leelah-alcorn-victim-of-christian-homeschool 
ing/ (describing the suicide of a transgender teen homeschooled by Christian parents who subjected 
the teen to conversion therapy). 
 56. See Luchenitser, supra note 45, at 85; Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: 
A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV., 466, 478 (2010). 
 57. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769–70, 2778 (2014) (including for-profit corpora-
tions within RFRA’s definition of “person” while proscribing state action making it “more expensive” 
to practice religious beliefs). 
 58. Id. at 2770, 2780. 
 59. See Luchenitser, supra note 45, at 67. 
  
1406 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
ents’ self-determination or liberty at all; rather, what they would limit is 
the legal power that the state bestows on persons whom the state has 
made legal parents.60 They would interfere with school operators’ and 
teachers’ liberty, by prohibiting certain practices (e.g., sex discrimination 
in approving students for leadership positions, moral exhortation that 
rises to the level of psychological abuse) and mandating others (e.g., 
teaching scientific methods, administering tests, and reporting results); 
but how one treats and instructs children outside one’s own family is 
generally not regarded as a core aspect of anyone’s religion. 
Of course, anything under the sun could be a core aspect of religion 
subjectively for someone; a pro-lifer might deem it a core aspect of his or 
her religion to possess the legal power to prevent all women from having 
an abortion. For that requirement to mean anything, courts would have 
to apply some objective notion of the concept of “core aspect.” Objec-
tively, core aspects of one’s religious freedom would include such things 
as participating in worship services, reading religious texts, and refraining 
from acts inherently contrary to one’s religious doctrines—in other 
words, matters within the realm of self-determination, essentially con-
cerning one’s sovereignty over oneself rather than how other people live 
their lives. In Hobby Lobby, though, the Court extended the concept to 
include merely being required to provide other persons with something 
(insurance coverage) that they could (without one knowing it) use to en-
gage in conduct one believes, as a matter of religious conviction, to be 
immoral.61 So it was an objection to being required (or financially co-
erced) to do something that one does not want to do, and in that sense, it 
infringed upon self-determination, but the thing to be done was so far 
removed from religious observance and study that the employers in-
volved in the Hobby Lobby litigation were for a substantial period of 
time unaware of the phenomenon about which they complained (provi-
sion of insurance coverage that could facilitate use of abortifacients).62 
The Court rejected the government’s argument that the plaintiff 
employers’ exercise of religion is not burdened by someone else’s inde-
pendently engaging in conduct the employers deem immoral.63 Presuma-
bly, there must be some conceptual connection between what the reli-
gious objector is required to do and the immoral conduct, so one could 
not claim, for example, that minimum wage laws burden one’s religion 
because some employees might use the extra wages to purchase alcohol 
or sexual services. The Court, however, left unclear how strong that con-
nection must be. It required nothing more than that conduct required of 
someone conflict with that person’s sincere religious belief,64 which effec-
                                                                                                                                      
 60. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion, supra note 34, at 1377. 
 61. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777–78. 
 62. See, e.g., Katie Sanders, Did Hobby Lobby Once Provide the Birth Control Coverage it Sued 
the Obama Administration Over?, POLITIFACT (July 1, 2014), http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/ 
statements/2014/jul/01/sally-kohn/did-hobby-lobby-once-provide-birth-control-coverag/. 
 63. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777–78. 
 64. Id. at 2779. 
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tively makes the notion of “core aspect” subjective. It could therefore 
encompass a belief that one’s religion requires one to dictate what sort of 
schooling another person receives. An interesting question is on what ba-
sis the Court would say that such a belief regarding one’s legal child is 
different in kind from such a belief regarding one’s spouse, one’s neigh-
bor, or one’s neighbor’s child. 
Moreover, the Court also suggested a capacious understanding of 
substantiality. Merely that government action makes one’s “‘practice 
of . . . religious beliefs more expensive,’” even though it does not prevent 
such practice, amounts to a burden that suffices to launch a RFRA objec-
tion.65 The ACA did not, in fact, force employers like Hobby Lobby to 
provide insurance coverage for contraceptives, but it imposed a financial 
penalty if they refused to do so.66 Almost any meaningful curricular man-
date or reporting requirement would make the operation of a religious 
school somewhat more costly, unless perhaps the government provided 
payments to cover those costs, and schools presumably would pass on 
those costs to the parents who patronize them. 
Of course, in Yoder, the Court treated as a substantial burden some-
thing even farther removed from a person’s practice of their religion than 
having to facilitate objectionable behavior by someone else.67 In the spe-
cial case of parents, merely being disempowered from preventing anoth-
er person from being exposed to certain ideas constitutes a burden on 
exercise of religion that triggers judicial review of state action. It certain-
ly would not have satisfied the Amish parents, or obviated the Constitu-
tional challenge, if the State of Wisconsin had said that the parents need 
not undertake any action themselves, that the state would send someone 
to their homes to transport their adolescent children to a school, and that 
the parents need only refrain from interfering. Ultimately, it was an 
“other-determining power,” not a liberty, at stake for the Amish parents, 
yet the Court found limitation of that power a substantial burden on reli-
gious exercise.68 This notion would seem bizarre in any other context, 
even though there are certainly many other contexts—some involving 
family relations, some not—in which some people wish quite intensely, 
and motivated by religious belief, to control what other people hear, 
think, and do. 
But suppose that courts interpreting federal or state RFRAs would 
not read into that legislation the same anomalous view of burden in 
child-rearing contexts, but rather would require as much in those con-
texts as they would in other contexts in which institutions are providing 
services to dependent persons at the request of family members, or as 
they would in a context involving only autonomous adults, such as the 
                                                                                                                                      
 65. Id. at 2770 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)). 
 66. Id. at 2776.  
 67. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209–11, 234 (1972) (holding compulsory attendance in 
public high schools for Amish students a substantial burden on the student’s religious beliefs). 
 68. Id. at 234. 
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employment context of Hobby Lobby.69 Still, religious schools and par-
ents could claim, after Hobby Lobby, to be substantially burdened by 
any new law that made the schools’ operations more expensive or re-
quired the schools, as a condition for remaining in operation, to provide 
something to students (e.g., secular knowledge, equal treatment) that the 
students could later use to do something the religious school operators 
would view as immoral (e.g., rejecting their parents’ faith, pursuing a ca-
reer other than housewife). Thus, courts applying a RFRA to a new set 
of legal mandates applicable to religious schools would have to apply 
strict scrutiny. 
E. The State Should Win Anyway 
In applying strict scrutiny, Hobby Lobby also signaled a stance 
highly protective of religious claimants. To establish a compelling gov-
ernment interest, the state must show that “the marginal interest in en-
forcing” its law as to “the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of 
religion is being substantially burdened” is a compelling one.70 Thus, it is 
not sufficient to show a government program or legal mandate on the 
whole serves a compelling state interest; the government must show that 
exempting any particular individual or business would undermine a com-
pelling state interest.71 Moreover, even if the state establishes that a com-
pelling interest is at stake in every individual case, it must meet a “least 
restrictive means” test for serving that interest that is “exceptionally de-
manding.”72 
The Court expressed serious doubts that the government had a 
compelling interest in “guaranteeing cost-free access to the four chal-
lenged contraceptive methods,” and it might have rejected the federal 
government’s position on that ground except that it found it easier to do 
so on the basis of the least-restrictive-means requirement.73 Concretely, 
the Court decided that RFRA can require the government to spend 
money and create a new program to accomplish by other means the aims 
it is pursuing through the challenged law. 
Though the Court adopted a quite rigorous approach to RFRA’s 
version of strict scrutiny, a hypothetical state law imposing on private 
schools and home schools meaningful curricular requirements, assess-
ments to enforce those requirements, and norms of gender equality and 
intellectual freedom should survive it. The state aim would be to ensure 
that all children receive an education that fosters their autonomy and 
                                                                                                                                      
 69. Cf. In re L.H., No. 1–13–3252, 2014 IL App (1st) 133252-U, ¶ 48 (Ill. App. Ct. July 23, 2014) 
(holding that a trial court order against a parent that she must “help ‘establish a support system out-
side of the church ministry’ for her children . . . did not substantially burden [the mother]'s free exer-
cise of religion.”). 
 70. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (emphasis added) (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–31 (2006)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2780. 
 73. Id. 
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prepares them for a wide range of careers consistent with their native 
abilities. State and federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, 
have consistently held that furthering children’s welfare and cognitive 
development is a compelling state interest.74 And it is difficult to imagine 
what less restrictive means there could be to accomplish that aim. It is 
not as if offering remedial education to adults can make up for their hav-
ing endured a grossly deficient or subordinating elementary and second-
ary education. If schools and parents object to standardized testing, it 
seems unlikely any would consent to some other form of government as-
sessment of student progress, such as interviews and portfolio reviews. 
Perhaps only if the objection is to particular curricular material or test 
questions that are not really essential to students’ intellectual growth, 
then schools and parents might demand accommodation in the form of 
exemption just from those specific aspects. The kinds of teachings to 
which religious objections are most commonly raised, however, are gen-
erally not inconsequential from a secular, child-welfare perspective—for 
example, sex education (without which young people might make life-
altering mistakes) and evolution (without which it might be difficult to 
pursue higher education in some scientific fields). 
But suppose a mandated critical thinking curriculum or a question 
on standardized tests incorporated a same-sex relationship into the situa-
tion to be analyzed. The Court’s strong rendering of “least restrictive 
means” might mean the state must devise alternatives for religious 
schools who deem such a relationship unfit for any discussion other than 
condemnation.75 From a child-centered perspective, that is not so trou-
bling. Of course, a young person who is gay and who is attending a reli-
gious school could benefit from curriculum or testing that presents same-
sex relationships as normal or in a positive light, but in that environment 
the presentation is likely to trigger from teachers negative comments, 
and on the whole it might be better for all students if the school is ac-
commodated, especially if that makes the school willing to accept a new 
mandate that improves the education it provides. 
This hypothetical scenario of new state regulations governing pri-
vate schooling, though, is quite unrealistic. Unless and until religious 
schooling visibly threatens state interests or the wellbeing of outsiders 
(e.g., by fomenting violent rebellion), state and federal legislators will 
undoubtedly remain heedless of what affect religious schooling is having 
on the wellbeing of children in them. At most, some Americans object to 
use of public money, through some form of voucher scheme, for illiberal 
or grossly inadequate schooling, but even when their own pocketbooks 
are affected, not enough people show concern about what goes on in re-
ligious schools or home schools to induce legislators to attempt to regu-
                                                                                                                                      
 74. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion, supra note 34, at 1403. 
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late or oversee those schools. The final Part of this Article offers specula-
tions about why that is so. 
IV. WHY DO WE EMPOWER PARENTS TO EDUCATIONALLY NEGLECT 
AND ABUSE CHILDREN? 
Given that states could—despite the Free Exercise Clause, parental-
control rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and federal and state 
RFRAs—impose meaningful regulations on the content of education in 
all non-public forms of schooling (with mandatory assessments to ensure 
compliance) and could prohibit harmful schooling practices in the “pri-
vate” realm, why do they not do so? Why are parents and schools 
throughout the country legally free to deprive their children of an educa-
tion that, from the states perspective, is adequate and instead to force 
children to experience intellectually stifling, psychologically abusive, and 
subordinating treatment? 
To be clear, I am by no means alleging that all, or even most, reli-
gious schools or home schools have these negative attributes; we can 
stipulate that most private schooling is at least adequate and that much 
of it is superior to the education provided in public schools in the same 
locale. But there is no denying that a significant portion of religious 
schools and home schools in the U.S. are grossly inadequate academical-
ly, from the state’s perspective, and aim to stifle children’s intellectual 
curiosity and to channel girls into conventional and severely limited so-
cial roles.76 We simply do not know how prevalent this phenomenon is, 
precisely because states have eschewed oversight and abandoned mil-
lions of children to whatever ideological inclinations their parents might 
have. 
This can only happen because of pervasive indifference. If a large 
number of voters wrote a simple letter to their state representatives urg-
ing them to begin overseeing the education of children in private schools 
and home schools, it would happen. Religious groups would protest ve-
hemently and perhaps even violently, but politicians are prepared to take 
on far more dangerous groups if necessary to avoid being voted out of 
office, especially given that they themselves do not have to enforce the 
laws they pass. So, why is no one writing to their state representatives 
about the lack of oversight of religious schools and home schools? The 
many reasons can be divided into two categories: (1) those that are atti-
tudinal, and (2) those that stem from fundamentally mistaken ways of 
thinking about child-rearing. 
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A. Attitudinal Obstacles to Legal Protection of Children’s Well-being 
A reality that affects all aspects of child-welfare law is that people 
are generally not concerned about the wellbeing of “other people’s chil-
dren,” just as they are generally unconcerned about other people in gen-
eral.77 Unless and until children subjected to illiberal, indoctrinatory, or 
subordinating schooling threaten our own interests in immediate and ev-
ident ways, we do not care. And people generally do not think about the 
long term consequence of a segment of the youth population receiving 
illiberal indoctrination—namely, that it breeds future intolerant and un-
reasonable adult citizens. 
At the extreme of selfishness, adults whose own children or grand-
children are receiving a high quality education that prepares them to suc-
ceed in mainstream society might actually, perhaps subconsciously, be 
happy that other people’s children are being disabled by educational 
deprivation. That only improves the ability of the children they do care 
about to enjoy greater comparative success. Perhaps there is even a 
darker disposition in the hearts and subconscious of many people, an af-
firmative animosity toward groups viewed, because of difference in reli-
gion or class or race, as “The Other,” and especially toward their un-
formed, unruly children. Perhaps most Americans do not want children 
of parents who are fundamentalist Christian or Muslim integrating into 
mainstream society; they might prefer that these children remain intellec-
tually hobbled and cloistered. 
In addition, and relatedly, there is a pervasive attitude of avoiding 
confrontation with ideological extremists unless absolutely necessary. 
Religious groups that absolutely reject any state authority to oversee the 
way they raise “their” children are frightening to the rest of us. Many 
view themselves as perpetually at war with mainstream society and the 
state, and some are prepared to take up arms in order to win that war.78 
Or at least we are sufficiently worried that they might do so that we cow-
er in the face of their angry protests.79 
Further, there is an attitude at work toward children, one that views 
them not as persons in their own right but as appendages or property of 
their parents. The prevailing orthodoxy in academia and in the legal sys-
tem is that children are distinct persons with rights of their own, but even 
highly educated liberals tend to view child-rearing legal issues through an 
adult-focused lens, perceiving conflicts over regulation of child-rearing as 
pitting the state against “the family” as a unitary entity represented sole-
ly and fully by the expressed wishes of the adults.80 
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B. Fundamental Misconceptions 
Also at work are some very basic misunderstandings about the 
state’s posture relative to children, and about the duties each of us owes 
to children. 
1. The Myth of State Inaction 
There is a widespread belief that when parents are legally free to do 
whatever they want to children, this is a situation of state inaction; the 
State is choosing to leave private citizens alone, something that in a lib-
eral society is presumptively proper for the State to do. This belief is ab-
solutely false. People become legal parents as to a child in the first in-
stance because the state makes them such.81 The fact that states 
everywhere choose to confer initial legal parent status automatically to 
biological parents of newborn children82 makes it seem so natural that the 
state’s role becomes invisible. But, it is in fact only because a state statute 
dictates that a child’s first legal mother is the birth mother and a child’s 
first legal father is the man presumed to be the biological father that pro-
creators come into legal possession of the children they create.83 The 
State is just as responsible for formation of this legal relationship as it is 
in the case of adoption, where we have no trouble seeing the state’s cru-
cial role and are more inclined to hold the State accountable for bad 
choices among parental parents. Further, the role of legal parent is a 
meaningless one except insofar as the state acts further to invest it with 
various liberties and powers as to the child in the legal relationship, liber-
ties and powers that no other persons possess. 
It is necessary that the State create legal parent-child relationships 
and that it invest legal parents with some liberties and powers, so that 
children can receive the care the State thinks necessary. But the necessity 
of investing liberties and powers does not excuse the State from doing so 
with the wrong persons or to an inappropriate degree (too little or too 
much). When parents demand that they be able to decide what sort of 
schooling children receive, what they are asking is not at all to be left 
alone by the State, but rather for the State to give them even greater le-
gal power over children than the State is otherwise inclined to give. This 
would be obvious to us if the State conferred similar powers on husbands 
over wives or guardians over incompetent adults, and we would demand 
justification from the State for its doing this. We would not say the State 
is simply leaving married couples alone if there were a law (as there used 
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to be in Anglo-American society and still is in some Muslim societies)84 
stating that husbands shall decide whether, when, and where wives re-
ceive any formal education. We would say the State is intervening in pri-
vate life in an extraordinary way that requires justification. There is justi-
fication for the state investing legal parents with substantial decision-
making power regarding children’s upbringing, but the power that states 
currently accord legal parents with respect to children’s education—that 
is, effectively to completely deny them a secular education and to subject 
them to subordination-promoting indoctrination85—cannot possibly be 
justified on child welfare grounds. It is therefore essential for people to 
recognize that this is what the state is doing and to insist on either a legit-
imate justification or a withdrawal of any modicum of parental power 
that is inconsistent with what the state views as children’s best interests. 
Relatedly, there is a widespread misconception about the responsi-
bility each of us bears as citizens for the fate of children whose parents, 
under current law, act to deny them the sort of education that promotes 
the children’s autonomy, gives them an open future, and treats them with 
equal respect. We are responsible because we are the electorate that leg-
islators are representing when they pass laws. Our acquiescence plays a 
causal role in the fate of these children, just as the acquiescence of most 
whites in the face of Jim Crow laws made them complicit. Anyone who is 
aware of what is happening to some children and of the role that the laws 
in their state play in that, yet who does not object to their state repre-
sentatives, is complicit in the denial of equal educational opportunity to 
children of illiberal religious adherents. It is especially troubling, per-
verse even, that scholars of religious liberty would devote so much atten-
tion to relatively effete concerns like the desire of a closely held corpora-
tion’s owners to be exempt from a law requiring them to provide certain 
sorts of health-care coverage to employees,86 yet remain utterly indiffer-
ent to the much greater threat to religious liberty that certain forms of 
religious schooling and homeschooling represent.87 This is itself evidence 
that adults in general, and academics at least as much as anyone else, are 
adult-centered in their moral outlook and insufficiently attentive to the 
moral claims of children. The point here is not that the concerns of Hob-
by Lobby’s owners are insubstantial; any conscientious person would be 
very upset to discover they were facilitating what they regard as murder. 
The point is rather that what we are collectively doing to some children, 
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by empowering their parents to prevent them from receiving an adequate 
education and to subject them instead to autonomy-thwarting and poten-
tially psychologically abusive indoctrination, is profoundly wrong. 
2. The Misunderstanding of Nonphysical Abuse 
An additional reason why most people are indifferent to religiously-
motivated educational neglect is more innocent. It is simply a false belief 
that nonphysical forms of abuse or neglect are less consequential for 
children. The reality is that what parents do to children’s minds generally 
has the greatest impact on their life prospects.88 Even when parents inflict 
physical or sexual abuse, the greatest harm in the long run in most cases 
is not the physical impact but rather the psychological impact. Broken 
bones and cigarette burns heal, but children’s perceptions of how they 
are viewed by their parents remains in their minds at some level long af-
ter. And the kinds of schooling of concern here can undermine children’s 
self respect and intellectual development to such an extent that they will 
never be able to have the sort of flourishing lives as adults that would 
otherwise have been possible for them. 
3. The Limits of “Parents Know Best” 
A final obstacle to popular demand for greater state supervision of 
private schooling that I will mention is the blinkered invocation of the 
“parents know best” mantra.89 This assertion is not only entirely lacking 
empirical support regarding aspects of children’s lives such as education 
and medical care, which require an extensive amount of knowledge and 
training that cannot be derived simply from daily interactions with a 
child. It is also completely beside the point. The disparity between what 
certain parents want in terms of schooling for children in their custody 
and what the state wants has nothing to do with knowledge; it arises from 
a conflict of values and of aims for the children’s lives. It is not as if par-
ents who want their children subjected to fundamentalist indoctrination 
are saying “I know my daughter well, and I know that she’s just the sort 
of person for whom gender subordination is right.” Or “Sure, critical 
thinking is good for some kids, but my Johnny’s personality is such that 
this is not good for him; he really thrives when we punish him for inde-
pendent thinking.” They are saying: “We reject the values of autonomy 
and gender equality that the liberal state endorses, and we think all chil-
dren would be better off if they received the type of schooling we are 
seeking for our children.” 
A misconception closely related to the “parents know best” mantra 
is that studies have shown all private schools to be better than public 
schools. Defenders of unregulated religious schooling or homeschooling 
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commonly cite studies showing that the average test score for children 
attending religious schools or being home schooled are higher than those 
for public school students.90 Even highly educated people will allude to 
such studies as explanation for not urging regulation of the private school 
sector. Perhaps they can be forgiven for being unaware that neither pri-
vate schools nor home schools are required to administer standardized 
tests, so the studies report results only for those who voluntarily choose 
to, creating a selection bias problem that should be obvious to anyone 
with basic understanding of empirical research. But they can still be 
faulted for not giving the matter sufficient thought to realize that, even if 
the studies showed an average for all private or homeschools, an average 
can mask wide disparities within a population and therefore instances of 
grossly deficient performance. Averages for a sector are, in fact, useless 
to policy reasoning.91 Nothing can turn on average figures. Imagine a 
state education department director announcing that there are no prob-
lems in public schools in that state (imagine Michigan, New York, Illi-
nois, for example) because the average test scores for students in the 
state are at the national average on a nationally-normed test. No one 
would take such a claim seriously. It is astonishing how quick people are 
to rest content with the condition of private and home schooling when 
comparative studies of average test score results are cited. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The most serious incursions on religious liberty in America today 
are being inflicted on children, by parents and private school operators, 
using power the State has given them. It is long past time to hold the 
State, which is simply an agent for us who vote, accountable for tolerat-
ing this. 
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